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Introduction
A large body of research examines how corporate decisions, such as investments, financing, and payouts, affect firms' stock prices and returns. Far less attention is paid to how the actions of one firm affect another firm's valuation. Yet firms' actions often do affect the operating decisions and financial performance of their competitors, collaborators, customers, and suppliers. Given the active role of stock prices in facilitating financial resource allocation across firms, how efficiently the stock market values externalities of corporate actions is a fundamentally important question that is still unanswered.
One type of corporate investment known to generate positive externality in peer firms is research and development (R&D) spending. Private-sector firms' R&D investments, for example, have been shown to generate positive spillovers on the output growth and productivity increase of peer firms (Hall 1993; Griliches 2002) . At least two channels for spillovers exist: First, ideas and technology may spread from one firm (or individual) to another, resulting in improved productivity for an entire industry or for multiple related industries. Second, a significant innovation might create new demand and expand the market. For example, the success of the iPhone ignited market interest in smartphones and opened a market for smartphone software. As an important source of endogenous economic growth (Romer 1990a (Romer , 1990b Griliches 1992) , these spillovers form the basic rationale for public policies on private-sector R&D investments (e.g., favorable tax treatment for R&D expenses). However, whether firms' R&D activities spill over to benefit the stock returns of industry peers, especially in a predictable way, remains an unanswered question.
In this study we examine market efficiency in valuing the R&D spillover effect. We document a delayed stock market reaction to the externality of corporate R&D spending by
showing that a firm's stock return can be predicted by the R&D investments of other firms in the same industry. Following a burst of R&D investments in an industry driven mainly by a small group of leading firms, peer firms enjoy improved operating performance, as well as positive abnormal stock returns, despite having little R&D growth themselves.
The fact that a firm's R&D spending positively predicts the stock returns of its peers suggests not only the economic significance of the spillover effect but also the inefficiency of inter-firm information transmission in the financial market. One possible cause of such inefficiency is the limited attention of investors in response to cross-firm information. Theoretical models argue that limited attention causes investor underreaction to value-relevant information and therefore leads to predictable returns (Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003 , Peng and Xiong 2006 , and Hirshliefer et al. 2011 . Several recent papers provide evidence that investors give limited attention to information contained in firms' own actions (e.g., Ramnath 2002; Hirshleifer et al. 2004; Hou and Moskowitz 2005; Hou 2007; DellaVigna and Pollet 2007, 2009; and Hirshleifer et al. 2009 ).
Likely investors may pay even less attention to value-relevant cross-firm information.
The unique informational nature of corporate R&D activities also contributes to the stock market's inefficiency in valuing the spillover effect of corporate R&D investments. R&D investments typically do not result in tangible assets and are difficult to identify in corporate balance sheets. 1 Rather, they result in an immediate drop in reported earnings, while the cash-flow benefit to either the investing firms or the peer firms may take years to materialize. Indeed, existing studies show that the financial market underreacts to firms' own R&D investments when valuing their stocks (see Chan et al. 2001 , Eberhart et al. 2004 , Lev and Sougiannis 1996 , and Lev et al. 2005 . Hirshleifer et al. (2013) and Cohen et al. (2013) further find that the market underreacts to the innovation efficiency or the past record of a firm's R&D success. Understanding the cross-firm valuation consequences of corporate R&D investments may present an even bigger challenge for investors.
We begin our empirical analysis by identifying R&D leaders and peers in industries that have experienced substantial aggregate R&D growth. We classify a small group of firms as leaders that have meaningful levels of R&D spending and relatively high R&D growth rates in their industries. We classify as peers the remaining firms in the same industries as leaders. For the period 1976-2012, we identify 2,261 firm-year observations of R&D leaders and 37,770 firm-year observations of peers. The average R&D growth rate is 150% for the former and 13% for the latter,
indicating a large disparity in R&D activities between these two types of firms.
We find that both R&D leaders and peers experience abnormal positive returns the year following their identification. An equal-weighted (value-weighted) portfolio of R&D leaders has an annualized alpha of 6.60% (5.16%) under the Carhart four-factor model, and an equal-weighted (value-weighted) portfolio of peers has an annualized four-factor alpha of 4.32% (3.00%), all statistically significant. To address the concern that the high returns to peers may be driven by their own R&D activities or may reflect the well-known phenomenon of industry momentum, we perform Fama-MacBeth regressions that control for firms' own R&D level and growth and past industry returns, as well as other firm characteristics, such as size, book-to-market ratio, and firms' own past returns. We find that peers continue to have significantly positive abnormal returns after applying theses controls.
To detect the real effects of R&D spillover, we examine the post-identification operating performance of R&D leaders and peers. We find that both R&D leaders and peers experience positive abnormal sales growth and profitability in the subsequent three years, even after controlling for various firm characteristics, including R&D level, R&D growth, and lagged operating performance.
We perform two sets of analyses to address the alternative explanation that exogenous shocks to the whole industry, not spillovers from industry R&D leaders to peers, cause increases in R&D spending and improvements in firm performance. First, we identify a known type of exogenous industry shock: demand shifts due to demographic changes (DellaVigna and Pollet 2007, 2013 ). Whether we control for such demand shocks or exclude industries experiencing large demographics-driven demand shocks, we continue to find evidence of R&D spillover. Second, we look at two other types of corporate discretionary spending that likely respond to industry shocks:
selling, general, and administrative (SGA) expenses and capital expenditures. We use the growth rates in these types of discretionary spending as proxies for a firm's anticipation of its future prospects. After controlling for this anticipation, we find that our main results are robust. Together, these findings suggest that exogenous industry shocks do not drive our results.
We further find that economic links between peers and leaders matter for detecting the spillover effect in stock returns and operating performance. We quantify the economic link between peers and leaders by the correlations of their past operating performance. Among the peers, those with stronger economic links to the leaders subsequently experience more positive abnormal returns and better operating performance.
Finally, we test the hypothesis that limited investor attention causes the return predictability of peers. This hypothesis predicts that peers receiving low attention should experience higher abnormal returns than those receiving high attention. At the same time, investor attention should not affect the real R&D spillover in terms of operating performance. For our tests, we construct three measures of investor attention to cross-firm information. These measures are based on the idea that the more investors hold shares of both a peer and a leader (or the more analysts cover both), the more likely investors (analysts) are to pay attention to cross-firm information and the more readily information about the leader is impounded into the peers' stock prices (e.g., Cohen
and Frazinni 2008).
Indeed, under all three measures of investor attention, we find that peers receiving low cross-firm attention generate positive abnormal returns (7.2% to 8.4% annualized), whereas peers receiving high cross-firm attention experience insignificant abnormal returns. On the other hand, peers with both high and low investor attention tend to have similarly good operating performance during the subsequent three years. Overall, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that investor attention affects the efficiency with which the stock market values cross-firm information.
Our study adds to the growing literature on innovation and stock prices. While existing studies focus on a firm's own innovation input (i.e., R&D investments) or its innovation success (in converting R&D to patents or revenues), this paper focuses on the spillover effect of R&D investments. We demonstrate that investors are slow in processing the cross-firm valuation consequences associated with industry leaders' R&D expenditures, which leads to predictable returns to peers.
Our study also joins two recent papers in examining how efficiently stock prices incorporate information about economically related firms. Cohen and Frazzini (2008) report that the returns of a firm's major customers can predict the firm's returns. Meanwhile, Menzly and Osbaz (2010) find that the stock returns in the supplier industry can predict the returns of stocks in the customer industry and vice versa. By examining the externalities of corporate actions and how firms' R&D investments affect the stock returns of industry peers, our research complements these papers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and our sample construction. Section 3 provides the empirical evidence on the stock returns and operating performance of R&D leaders and peers. Section 4 investigates the effect of investor attention.
Section 5 concludes.
Data and Sample
We identify "R&D Leaders" and "Peers" for each year during the period 1976-2012. Our sample starts with all firms that are covered in both CRSP and Compustat. We adopt the following sample selection criteria: First, a firm must have no missing values of total assets (Compustat variable AT) and sales (Compustat variable SALE) for a given year. Second, following Fama and
French (1993) , we exclude utility (SIC=4900-4999) and financial (SIC=6000-6999) firms since these firms either operate in a regulated environment or have characteristics substantially different from other firms in the data. Third, we classify firms into 48 industries following Fama and French's (1997) classifications. An industry must have at least ten firms in a year to be included in the sample.
To identify R&D leaders and peers, we first define R&D increase events. An industry has an R&D increase event if its aggregate R&D growth rate is greater than 20% in a given year (which accounts for approximately 25% of industry-year observations in the whole sample). Then, within an identified industry-year, we define R&D leaders as those firms that have meaningful R&D expenditures (R&D-to-sales ratio and R&D-to-assets ratio are both greater than 2% in the previous year) and that have R&D growth rates ranked among the top 10% (or top five, whichever has the larger number of firms) in the industry. We define the remaining firms in the industry, excluding those classified as R&D leaders during the previous three years, as peers. 2 For industry-years without an R&D increase event, we classify all firms as nonevent firms. Our sample therefore includes three types of firms: R&D leaders, peers, and nonevent firms. Several alternative procedures for identifying R&D leaders and peers ensure the robustness of our analysis. They are detailed in Section 3.3.
In studying the impact of R&D investments by leaders, we control for a firm's own R&D expenditures and other firm characteristics. These variables include the firm's own R&D growth rate (R&D growth), R&D expenditure relative to market capitalization (RDE), log market capitalization (ln(size)), the book-to-market ratio (B/M), the average monthly stock return during the past 11 months (with a one-month gap between the holding period and the current month, PrRET), and industry price momentum (Industry PrRET), measured as the returns to the valueweighted industry portfolios during the past 11 months. To alleviate the influence of outliers, we winsorize all variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles, except for PrRET and Industry PrRET. We define all variables in the Appendix. For each of the three types of firms, we report the means and standard deviations of firm characteristics. We also test the significance of the differences in mean characteristics across firm types. Consistent with our definition of R&D leaders, the comparison shows that leaders have significantly higher R&D growth than the other two groups (150% versus 13% for peers and 8%
for nonevent firms). Thus, the high R&D growth of the identified industries is essentially driven by a small number of R&D leaders. Leaders also have significantly higher levels of R&D spending-as measured by the ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets (RDA) and that to market capital (RDE)-than do peers and nonevent firms. Finally, R&D leaders have significantly lower book-to-market ratios, suggesting that they have higher growth opportunities. times over the 37-year sample period. Many other industries also appear on the list, however, such as machinery (9 times), communications (3), rubber and plastic products (3), wholesale (2), consumer goods (1), retail (1), and healthcare (1).
Empirical Results

Stock Returns of R&D Leaders and Peers
In this section, we look at the stock returns of R&D leaders, as well as those of peers, in the year following the identification of these two groups of firms. We examine their abnormal returns using both the portfolio approach and the regression approach.
We first discuss the portfolio approach. In June of each calendar year t, we identify R&D leaders and peers based on their financial statement data for the fiscal year ending in year t − 1.
We then form equal-weighted and value-weighted portfolios for the leaders and the peers, respectively. The stocks in the portfolios remain the same from July of year t to June of year t + 1.
We find that for equal-weighted portfolios, the average monthly returns are 0.88% and 0.75% for the leader and peer portfolios, respectively. For value-weighted portfolios, the average monthly returns are 0.75% for leaders and 0.63% for peers.
To assess the abnormal performance of R&D leaders and peers, we compute Carhart (1997) four-factor alphas based on the monthly time series of the portfolio returns. Table 3 reports the performance of both R&D leaders and peers. The equal-weighted leaders portfolio has a monthly alpha of 0.55% (i.e., an annual abnormal return of 6.60%), and the value-weighted leaders portfolio has a monthly alpha of 0.43% (i.e., an annual abnormal return of 5.16%). The abnormal returns to firms with high R&D growth are consistent with the findings reported by existing studies (e.g.,
Eberhart et al. 2004).
What has not been previously documented is that peers also experience positive abnormal returns. The table shows that the equal-weighted peer portfolio has a monthly alpha of 0.36% (i.e., an annual abnormal return of 4.32%), and the value-weighted peer portfolio has a monthly alpha of 0.25% (i.e., an annual abnormal return of 3.00%). 3 The equal-weighted peer portfolio's market beta is about 1.13. It has a significantly positive loading on the SMB factor, a significantly negative loading on the HML factor, and a significantly negative loading on the UMD factor. The coefficients for the value-weighted peer portfolio suggest a similar pattern.
Could peers' own R&D expenditure level or growth explain their abnormal returns? To answer this question, we divide peers into two groups: those with high (i.e., above-median) and low (i.e., below-median) R&D growth during the identification year. The average aggregate growth rates for the two groups are 18.9% and 8.4%, respectively. The low-growth peer group's 8.4% growth rate does not differ significantly from the 8.0% growth rate of the nonevent firms.
Nonetheless, we find significantly positive alphas for both peer groups. For equal-weighted portfolios, high-and low-growth peers have monthly alphas of 0.40% and 0.33%, respectively, and the difference is not statistically significant. The same pattern holds for value-weighted portfolios. We also divide peers into groups with high and low R&D expenditures relative to assets.
While the low-R&D group has expenditures no higher than the nonevent firms, both peer groups still have significantly positive abnormal returns.
To address the possibility that high R&D expenditure level or growth subsequent to identification explains peers' abnormal returns, we further divide peers into subsamples based on their R&D level or growth in the year following the identification. We observe positive alphas observed in all the subsamples. These results suggest that peers' R&D activities do not explain their abnormal returns; the returns are most likely due to the spillover effect. These results are available in the Internet Appendix.
Next, we discuss the regression approach to examine the R&D spillover effect on stock returns. Table 4 reports the Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regression results. The dependent variable is the stock return during a 12-month holding period, starting from July of year t to June of year t + 1, where R&D leaders and peers are identified as of June of year t. Unlike the portfolio approach, we include nonevent firms in the regression analysis. The main explanatory variables are two dummies, for R&D leaders and peers respectively. Since existing studies find that firms with high R&D growth and high levels of R&D spending experience abnormal returns (e.g., Eberhart et al. 2004; Li 2011; Chan et al. 2001) , we control for a firm's own R&D growth and its R&D spending relative to market capitalization (RDE). In addition, we control for firm size, bookto-market ratio, price momentum, and industry momentum. We measure firm size as market capitalization as of June in year t. Book-to-market (B/M) is the ratio of equity's book value to market value at the end of the fiscal year t -1, when the ratio is positive, and zero otherwise. We also include a dummy for firms with negative B/M ratios to take into account the possibility that the relation of B/M with returns for these firms might be different. We measure price momentum by the stock return during the 11 months ending in May of year t. Industry momentum, following Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) , is measured by the past 11-month return ending in May of year t for the value-weighted industry portfolios.
Following Fama and MacBeth (1973), we perform cross-sectional regressions in each year and then compute the time-series averages of the coefficients and the time-series t-statistics. Table   4 reports the regression results. Column (1) of Table 4 only includes leader and peer dummies as explanatory variables. Column (2) of Table 4 includes control variables.
Under both specifications, the peer dummy has a significantly positive coefficient, suggesting that following the industry R&D increase event, peers experience positive abnormal returns not explained by various firm and industry characteristics considered in the regressions.
Neither a firm's own R&D level or growth nor industry momentum explains away this effect.
In Columns (3) to (5), we include in the regressions additional control variables: the number of financial analysts following the stock, the percentage of the firm's shares held by active mutual funds, and the percentage of shares held by 13f institutional investors, respectively. We use these variables again in Section 4 as measures of investor attention. Due to constraints of data availability, we restrict the sample period for the regressions in Columns (4) and (5) The significantly positive coefficient on the leader dummy in Column (1) is consistent with the results under the portfolio approach. However, including the controlling variables in Column (2) causes the coefficient to become barely significant, and their inclusion greatly reduces the magnitude of the coefficient. 5 In Columns (3) to (5), after we further control for investor attention, the leader coefficient becomes statistically insignificant. Thus, leaders' own characteristics (in particular their R&D activities) and investor attention explain the abnormal returns to leaders.
Overall, the results in both Tables 3 and 4 support the notion that the stock market tends to underreact to the value-relevant information about substantial R&D increases by other firms in the same industry.
Operating Performance of Leaders and Peers
If delayed market reaction to the spillover effect of leaders' R&D growth causes abnormal returns to peers, we expect peers' operating performance to improve following the leaders' substantial R&D increases. 6 We investigate this hypothesis here.
We use three measures of operating performance. These measures reflect market expansion and productivity growth, the two possible channels through which the real effect of R&D spillover takes place. To capture the market expansion effect, we use a firm's annual sales growth rate. To capture productivity growth, we include gross profit margin and return on assets (ROA). Gross profit margin is sales minus costs of goods sold, divided by sales; ROA is operating income scaled by lagged total assets. We define these variables in detail in the Appendix.
ROA has been popularly used as a measure of operating performance by researchers (e.g., Barber and Lyon 1996) . We include gross profit margin because it is based on gross profit (i.e., sales minus costs of goods sold) and does not include R&D expenses. Therefore, the accounting treatment of R&D expenditures-that is, the accelerated expensing of R&D (e.g., Lev and
Sougiannis 1996)-does not influence the measure. In contrast, operating income is gross profit minus R&D expenses and other expenses (adjusted for nonoperating items). Variations of sales growth and gross profit margin measures have been used in existing studies on the impact of R&D on firms' own operating performance (e.g., Chan et al. 2001; Eberhart et al. 2004 ).
Since the cash-flow benefit of R&D spillover may take years to materialize, we examine the operating performance of leaders and peers during the three years following year t (i.e., the identification year). We use the Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regression approach. We assign the dependent variable as one of the three operating performance measures for one of the three subsequent years. The main explanatory variables are the dummies for leaders and peers. The control variables include the corresponding lagged operating performance measure, a firm's RDE and R&D growth, firm size, book-to-market ratio, a dummy for negative B/M, and past stock returns; all are measured as of June in year t.
We report the results in Table 5 . For all three measures of operating performance and during all three subsequent years, the coefficients on the peer dummy are significantly positive even after controlling for various firm characteristics. For example, in year t + 1, the coefficient on the peer dummy for sales-growth regression is 1.89. This suggests that, all else being equal, peers' sales growth increases by 1.89 percentage points. The effect weakens a bit over the next two years, but the coefficients remain significant, both statistically and economically. The results are consistent with the notion that leaders' R&D activities have real spillover effects on peers'
sales growth and profitability.
Robustness Checks
We perform several robustness checks. For brevity, we describe the tests and results here but leave the tabulated results in the Internet Appendix.
We consider two alternative ways of defining R&D leaders and peers. First, when identifying an R&D increase event, instead of using an absolute cutoff for the aggregate industry R&D growth, we define an industry as having an event if its aggregate R&D growth rate ranks among the top quintile across industries in a given year. We then define leaders and peers as before.
Second, we define an R&D increase event based on leader (candidates') R&D growth. For each industry year, we select firms that have meaningful R&D expenditures (the R&D-to-sales ratio and the R&D-to-assets ratio both must be greater than 2% over the previous year) and that have R&D growth rates ranking among the top decile (or top five, whichever has a larger number of firms). We classify these firms as R&D leader candidates. We then compute the aggregate R&D growth rate of the leader candidates in a given industry. An industry has an R&D increase event in a year if its leader candidates' aggregate R&D growth rate ranks in the top quintile across all industries. For each industry with an identified R&D increase event, we then define its leader candidates as R&D leaders and the remaining firms as peers. Using this alternative definition, if spillover happens, it does so from a group of firms in the industry (leaders) to another group of firms (peers).
Stock return regressions and operating performance regressions using these alternative definitions yield results consistent with those reported in Tables 3, 4 , and 5.
In addition, we vary the sample selection criteria to examine two alternative samples. First, to see whether a small number of industries drive our results, we exclude the three industries that each experience R&D increase events over more than half of the sample period (i.e., medical equipment, computers, and business services). This results in 1,603 firm-year observations of leaders and 29,003 observations of peers. Second, we exclude firms with share prices of less than $5 from our analyses. Using these alternative samples, we repeat the analyses reported in Tables   3, 4 , and 5. These results are also robust.
Spillover versus Exogenous Industry Shocks
An alternative interpretation of our results thus far is that exogenous industry shocks that boost firms' R&D activities and performance cause the abnormal stock returns and operating performance of peers (as well as those of leaders). For example, suppose an industry experiences a positive demand shock. Some firms respond by increasing R&D investments, whereas others do not. Regardless, all firms in the industry benefit from the demand shock and experience improved operating performance, and positive abnormal stock returns if investors underreact to the shock initially.
We use two approaches to differentiate the spillover effect from the exogenous shock hypothesis. First, we identify a known type of exogenous industry shock-the demand shocks due to demographic changes-and see whether our results hold after controlling for such shocks.
Second, we control in a more general way the possibility that firms' anticipation of good future prospects drive increases in R&D.
Evidence from Demand Shifts Due to Demographic Changes
Exogenous industry shocks not induced by firm activities can be difficult to identify.
Activities started by a small group of industry leaders and propagated by spillover effects will also lead to an industry-wide phenomenon. In this section, we follow DellaVigna and Pollet (2007, 2013) and focus on the demand shifts driven by demographic changes. DellaVigna and Pollet (2007) show that forecastable (and exogenous) demand changes for age-sensitive industries due to variations in age cohort size can predict industry profitability and stock returns. Positive demand shifts also increase corporate investments and R&D spending (DellaVigna and Pollet 2013).
We investigate whether these demographic-related demand shifts can explain peers' abnormal stock returns and operating performance. To control for industry shocks due to demographic changes, we include predicted shortand long-term demand growth as additional explanatory variables in the regressions that examine 7 We start with the industry demand growth data provided by DellaVigna and Pollet on the American Economic Review Web site. We then manually map their industry classification (based on SIC codes) to the appropriate Fama-French industry. If a Fama-French industry corresponds to multiple demographic industries, we use the average growth rate of the demographic industries. If a demographic industry corresponds to two Fama-French industries (this is rare), we use its growth rate for the Fama-French industry that has the most overlapping SIC codes with the demographic industry and leave the growth rate for the other Fama-French industry missing. The mapping details are available upon request.
peers' subsequent stock returns and operating performance (as in Tables 4 and 5 ). For industries not affected by demographic changes, we set these variables to zero. The results, reported in Panel A of Table 6 , show that after controlling for these demand changes, peers continue to experience positive abnormal returns and abnormal operating performance. Consistent with the findings of DellaVigna and Pollet (2007, 2013) , we also observe that forecasted long-term demand growth has a significantly positive impact on next-year stock returns, and forecasted short-term demand growth has a significantly positive impact on operating performance during the subsequent two years.
Alternatively, we exclude from our sample industry years subject to significant positive demographic demand shocks, which tend to cause both increases in corporate R&D spending and improvements in operating performance. 8 We repeat the analyses reported in Tables 3, 4 , and 5.
The results are robust (and available in the Internet Appendix).
Taken together, exogenous industry shocks related to demographic changes do not appear to drive the R&D spillover effect we observe in the data.
Evidence from Growth in Other Discretionary Spending
In this section we try to control for industry shocks in a more general way. If an industry shock leads to better operating performance, and if the anticipation of such improved performance leads to increases in R&D spending, firms will likely increase other types of discretionary spending as well, in response to such shocks. We look at two other types of discretionary spending: capital expenditure (CAPEX) and selling, general, and administrative (SGA) expenses. We measure the growth rates in CAPEX and in SGA, as well as the growth in the sum of CAPEX and SGA, which we refer to as "discretionary spending" (DISC). Taking these growth rates as proxies for firms'
anticipation of future prospects, we examine whether our results continue to hold after controlling for these variables. Existing studies, such as Abarbanell and Bushee (1998) and Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) , show that the SGA expenses positively predict stock returns.
First, we observe similar and not statistically different average growth rates in CAPEX, SGA, and DISC for R&D leaders, peers, and nonevent firms. For example, the average growth rates in DISC for leaders, peers, and nonevent firms are 19%, 19%, and 18%, respectively, none of which is significantly different from the others. The simple comparison gives no hint that leaders and peers on average experience more positive exogenous industry shocks than nonevent firms.
In Panel B of Table 6 , we perform stock return and operating performance regressions, similar to those in Tables 4 and 5 , but we include DISC growth as an additional control variable.
The coefficients on peers remain significantly positive after controlling for the growth of discretionary spending. When we separately include the growth rates of the two components of DISC-SGA growth and CAPEX growth-in the regressions, we observe similar results (available in the Internet Appendix). Thus, our results continue to hold after controlling for firms' responses in their discretionary spending to industry shocks.
Economic Links and the Spillover Effect
Existing economic studies have documented that corporate R&D investments can benefit the output growth and productivity of related firms through economic links, such as inter-firm collaboration, geographic proximity, and customer-supplier relationship. Autant-Bernard (2001a , 2001b ) documents a positive relation between a firm's R&D productivity and the R&D activities of "technological neighbors." Several studies find that R&D spillovers tend to be geographically concentrated (Jaffe 1989; Jaffe et al. 1993; Bottazzi and Peri 2003) . Harhoff (1996) finds R&D spillover across upstream and downstream industries.
Following these studies, we expect a stronger spillover effect when firms have stronger economic links. That is, we expect to see higher operating performance for peers that have stronger economic links to leaders. Further, if the market does not fully appreciate the role of economic links in causing the real spillover-for example, if the market anticipates similar real R&D spillover despite peers' heterogeneous economic links to the leaders-then we also expect to see higher abnormal returns for peers that have stronger economic links to the leaders.
We construct measures of economic links based on the correlation in the operating performance between a peer and the R&D leaders in its industry. For each peer, we calculate the correlation of its operating performance with that of each leader in the industry; we then average the correlations across the leaders. We identify a peer with a higher average correlation as having a stronger economic link to the leaders. The operating performance measures are the three described in Section 3.2: sales growth, gross profit margin, and ROA.
In Panel A of Table 7 , we examine the effect of economic links on the stock returns of peers. The regression specification is similar to that used in Table 4 . We define the annual stock returns in the year subsequent to the identification of leaders and peers as the dependent variable.
The control variables include firms' R&D growth, RDE, firm size, book-to-market ratio, past stock returns, and past industry returns. As in Table 4 , we include a dummy for the leaders. Unlike In Panel B of Table 7 , we examine whether the spillover effect differs in terms of operating performance across peers with different economic links to the leaders. We use a similar regression specification to that in Table 5 , except that we replace the peer dummy in Table 5 with two dummies for peers with different degrees of economic link: LowLinkPeer and HighLinkPeer. We report only the results in which we measure the dependent variable, operating performance, for the year following the identification of R&D leaders and peers, that is, year t + 1. We have also performed regressions on operating performance measures for years t + 2 and t + 3 and obtain consistent results; we leave these results untabulated for brevity's sake.
Across all three measures of economic link (i.e., based on correlations in sales growth, gross profit margin, and ROA), peer firms with stronger links to leaders enjoy better operating performance than firms with weaker links. This is consistent with the hypothesis that peer firms with stronger economic links to the leaders benefit more from leaders' R&D investments.
Investor Inattention to Cross-Firm Information
In the above analysis we find that peers experience positive abnormal returns following leaders' R&D increases. In other words, the stock market exhibits inefficiency in pricing crossfirm value-relevant information. If investor inattention to cross-firm information causes this inefficiency, we expect to see abnormal returns concentrated in peers receiving low investor attention. On the other hand, investor attention should not affect the real spillover in terms of peers' operating performance. In this part of the analysis, we directly measure investor attention to crossfirm information and examine its effect on stock price efficiency.
We construct three measures of investor attention for cross-firm information. These measures rely on the idea that investors are more likely to pay attention to cross-firm information if they hold both a peer firm and a leader firm in their portfolios as opposed to holding only peers or only leaders (or if financial analysts cover both types of firms compared with when they cover only one type). The first measure, common mutual fund holdings, is similar to that of Cohen and Frazzini (2008) . We calculate this variable as the number of actively managed equity mutual funds holding both the peer in question and any of the leaders in the same industry, divided by the number of active equity funds holding the peer. We define the second measure, common institutional holdings, as the number of institutional investors holding both the peer in question and any of the leaders in the same industry, divided by the number of institutional investors holding the peer. The third measure, common analyst coverage, is the number of analysts covering both the peer in question and any of the leaders, divided by the number of analysts covering the peer. Investor attention increases with all three measures.
The data for institutional holdings and mutual fund holdings come from the ThomsonReuters 13f institutional holdings dataset and the Thomson-Reuters mutual fund holdings dataset.
Since the coverage of these two datasets starts in 1980, the sample period for our analyses is from 1980-2012. For analysis involving analyst coverage, the available IBES data on individual analysts' forecasts limit the sample period for portfolio formation to 1982-2012. We construct these measures using information available at the end of June of each year.
We first test the effect of investor attention on stock returns. We classify Peers into high and low attention groups by the median of an investor attention measure. Panel A of Table 8 reports the alphas of the Carhart four-factor alphas for equal-weighted portfolios of peers with low and high investor attention, respectively. Under all three measures of attention, we find that lowattention peers experience significantly positive abnormal returns, whereas high-attention peers experience insignificant abnormal returns. The differences in alphas between low-attention and high-attention peers are all statistically significant. Specifically, when we measure cross-firm investor attention by common mutual fund holdings, low-attention peers experience a monthly alpha of 0.70% (corresponding to an annual abnormal return of 8.40%), significant at the 1% level.
The monthly alpha for high-attention peers is an insignificant 0.16%. 10 When we use common analyst coverage and common institutional holdings to measure cross-firm investor attention, the resulting alphas of the low-attention peers are 0.68% and 0.60%, respectively, both significant at the 1% level. In contrast, under the corresponding attention measures, the alphas of high-attention peers are 0.24% and 0.22%, respectively, both statistically insignificant. Our tests of valueweighted portfolios yield similar results (available in the Internet Appendix).
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We then perform Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional stock return regressions similar to those reported in Table 4 . However, we replace the peers dummy with two new dummies: a low-attention peer dummy (LowAttentionPeer) for peers with below-median investor attention and a highattention peer dummy (HighAttentionPeer) for peers with above-median investor attention. In these regressions, we also control for a firm's own mutual fund/institutional holding or its own analyst coverage.
Panel B of Table 8 reports the regression results. Under all three attention measures, the coefficient is significantly positive for LowAttentionPeer and insignificant for HighAttentionPeer.
The differences between the coefficients are statistically significant. The results in both panels of Table 8 thus support the notion that abnormal returns to peers are concentrated in firms receiving low investor attention (with respect to the cross-firm information). We also note statistically insignificant coefficients on the leader dummy in the cross-sectional regressions, suggesting that R&D leaders do not have abnormal returns after controlling for various firm characteristics.
The results in Table 3 show that the market underreacts to leaders' R&D growth. The results in Table 8 , however, suggest that the market correctly prices the implication of leaders' activities on high-attention peers. To reconcile this apparent conflict, we conjecture that although the stock market underreacts to leaders' R&D activities on average, such information is correctly reflected in some leaders' stock prices. The attention hypothesis predicts that the market should correctly price those leaders receiving high attention. In other words, the abnormal returns to R&D leaders should be concentrated in firms that receive low investor attention. To test this conjecture, we measure investor attention to a leader based on its analyst coverage, active mutual fund holding, and institutional holdings. We classify leaders into two groups based on each of the investor attention measures and compute the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor alphas for portfolios of highattention and low-attention leaders. Using all three proxies of investor attention, for both equalweighted and value-weighted portfolios, we find that the low-attention leaders have significantly positive alphas, whereas the high-attention leaders have insignificant alphas. This evidence is consistent with the attention hypothesis that abnormal returns are concentrated in leaders receiving low investor attention.
To examine the relation between investor attention and operating performance, we perform cross-sectional regressions on operating performance. We use regression specifications similar to those in Table 5 , but replace the Peer dummy with the LowAttentionPeer and HighAttentionPeer dummies. We also control for a firm's own mutual fund/institutional holding or its own analyst coverage. Table 9 reports the regression results, with investor attention measured by common analyst coverage, common institutional holdings, and common mutual fund holdings, respectively.
We examine three operating performance measures-sales growth, gross profit margin, and ROA-in the year after the identification of leaders and peers. For each regression, we find significant positive coefficients on both LowAttentionPeer and HighAttentionPeer but no significant difference between the two. Thus, investor attention only affects the stock market valuation of the spillover effect, but not the real effect of spillover per se. We have also performed regressions using the operating performance measures for the second and third years after the identification of R&D leaders and peers. The results are consistent with those reported here.
In summary, we find that across peers, those receiving lower investor attention tend to have higher abnormal returns; on the other hand, the level of investor attention does not affect the real spillover effect in terms of operating performance. The results thus support the investor attention hypothesis.
Conclusions
Firms are often so interconnected that one firm's actions affect the operations and performance of another's. Our findings suggest that when valuing a stock, investors pay inadequate attention to the information about related firms' actions.
We document evidence of predictable returns, due to the R&D activities of other firms within the same industries. After a small group of R&D leaders in an industry substantially increase R&D investments, peer firms in the same industry experience positive abnormal returns, without aggressively growing their own R&D. Consistent with R&D spillover, we find that peer firms experience better operating performance in subsequent years. Also consistent with R&D spillover, we find that across peers, those with stronger economic links to the leaders experience higher abnormal stock returns and better operating performance. Our analysis suggests that exogenous industry shocks to demand or productivity do not cause peers' abnormal returns or abnormal operating performance. Further, we find evidence that the predictable returns for peer firms are related to limited investor attention to cross-firm information. Abnormal returns are concentrated in those peer firms receiving low investor attention. Variables are listed in the order of their appearance in the paper.
Appendix: Variable Definitions
R&D increase event:
We define an R&D increase event based on the industry-aggregate R&D growth rate. An industry is defined as having such an event if its aggregate R&D growth rate is greater than 20% in a given year.
Leader: A dummy equal to 1 if the firm belongs to an industry year that experiences an R&D increase event and the firm is an R&D leader. We define R&D Leaders as those firms with meaningful R&D expenditures (both R&D-to-sales ratio and R&D-to-assets ratio must be greater than 2% in year t − 1, with year t being the identification year) and with R&D growth rates ranking among the top 10% (or top 5, whichever has a larger number of firms) in the industry.
Peer: A dummy equal to 1 if the firm belongs to an industry year that experiences an R&D increase event and the firm is not a Leader during the current or the previous 3 years.
R&D growth:
The difference in R&D expenditures (XRD) in years t and t − 1 divided by R&D expenditures (XRD) in year t − 1.
RDA: R&D expenditures (XRD) of year t scaled by total assets (AT) of year t.
RDE: R&D expenditures (XRD) of year t scaled by market value of equity of year t. Market value of equity is calculated as shares outstanding (CSHPRI) times share price (PRCC_F).
Ln(Size): Natural logarithm of market capitalization, computed as share price times shares outstanding (both from CRSP) as of the end of June of year t.
B/M:
B/M is the book-to-market ratio when it is positive, and 0 otherwise. Book-to-market ratio is measured as the ratio of book equity (CEQ) of fiscal year ending in year t − 1 to market equity (from CRSP) at the end of year t − 1.
Negative B/M dummy:
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the book-to-market ratio (B/M) is negative.
PrRET:
The average monthly return during the past 11 months ending in May of year t.
Industry PrRET: Value-weighted average industry returns in the past 11 months ending in May of year t. The data are from CRSP.
Sales growth: Sales (SALE) of year t minus sales of year t − 1, divided by sales of year t − 1.
Gross profit margin: Sales (SALE) of year t minus costs of goods sold (COGS) of year t and then divided by sales of year t.
ROA: Operating income (OIADP) of year t scaled by total assets (AT) of year t − 1.
STGrowth:
The forecasted annualized percentage growth rate of consumption during years t to t + 5.
LTGrowth:
The forecasted annualized percentage growth rate of consumption during years t + 5 to t + 10.
DISC growth:
The change in other discretionary spending (which is the sum of SG&A and capital expenditures) defined as the difference in discretionary spending in years t and t − 1 divided by discretionary spending in year t − 1.
Sales growth correlation:
At the end of June of each year t, we obtain the past 10 years of annual sales growth rate (previously defined) of Peers and Leaders. For a given Peer, we compute its correlation in sales growth rate with a Leader, and then we take the average of these correlations across all Leaders in the Peer's industry.
Profit margin correlation:
At the end of June of each year t, we obtain the past 10 years of annual gross profit margin (previously defined) of Peers and Leaders. For a given Peer, we compute its correlation in profit margin with a Leader, and then we take the average of these correlations across all Leaders in the Peer's industry.
ROA correlation:
At the end of June of each year t, we obtain the past 10 years of gross ROA (previously defined) of Peers and Leaders. For a given Peer, we compute its correlation in ROA with a Leader, and then we take the average of these correlations across all Leaders in the Peer's industry.
Analyst coverage:
The number of analysts providing EPS forecasts on a firm in June of year t. The data are from the IBES Detailed History File.
Own holdings:
The percentage of outstanding shares held by active mutual funds or institutional investors as of June of year t. The data are from Thomson-Reuters mutual fund holdings and institutional holdings (13F).
Common analyst coverage:
The number of analysts providing EPS forecasts for a Peer and for any of the Leaders in the same industry as of June of year t, divided by the number of analysts covering the Peer as of June of year t. The data are from the IBES Detailed History File.
Common mutual fund holdings:
The number of actively-managed equity mutual funds reporting holdings on a Peer as well as on any of the Leaders in the same industry during the second calendar quarter of year t, divided by the number of active funds holding the Peer during the second calendar quarter of year t. If a fund reports holdings at the semiannual frequency and does not report holdings during the second calendar quarter of year t, we look at the fund's holdings reported for the first quarter of year t. The data are from Thomson-Reuters mutual fund holdings.
Common institutional holdings:
The number of institutional investors reporting holdings on a Peer as well as on any of the Leaders in the same industry during the second calendar quarter of year t, divided by the number of institutional investors holding the Peer during the second calendar quarter of year t. The data are from ThomsonReuters institutional holdings (i.e., 13F).
LowAttentionPeer: A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm is a Peer with low (below-median) investor attention, measured by common analyst coverage, common mutual fund holdings, or common institutional holdings as of June of year t.
HighAttentionPeer: A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm is a Peer with high (above-median) investor attention, measured by common analyst coverage, common mutual fund holdings, or common institutional holdings as of June of year t. The table reports summary statistics of sample firms for the period of 1976-2012. R&D growth is the difference in R&D expenditures in years t and t − 1 divided by R&D expenditures in year t − 1. RDA is the research and development expenditures scaled by assets. RDE is R&D expenditures scaled by market value of equity. Ln(Size) is the log market capitalization. B/M is the book-to-market ratio when it is positive, and zero otherwise. PrRET is the average monthly return during the past 11 months ending in May of year t. All firm characteristic variables except PrRET are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The difference in means is based on a t-test. The t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
(1) Leader (2)Peer (3)Nonevent (1)- (2) (1)- (3) (2)- (3) This table reports the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions that examine the stock returns to the R&D Leaders, Peers, and nonevent firms. The dependent variable is the annual stock return from July of year t to June of year t + 1. Leader is a dummy variable for R&D Leaders. Peer is a dummy variable for the Peers. R&D growth is the difference in R&D expenditures in year t and t − 1 divided by R&D expenditures in year t − 1. RDE is R&D expenditures scaled by market value of equity. Ln(Size) is the log of market capitalization. B/M is the book-to-market ratio when it is positive, and zero otherwise. Negative B/M dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the book-to-market ratio is negative.
PrRET is the average monthly return during the past 11 months ending in May of year t. Industry PrRET is the average value-weighted industry returns in the past 11 months ending in May of year t. Stock returns, PrRET, and Industry PrRET are expressed in percentage points. Analyst coverage is the number of analysts covering the firm as June of each year in column (3). Mutual fund holding is the percentages of shares outstanding owned by active mutual funds in column (4). Institutional holding is the percentages of shares outstanding owned by institutional investors in columns (5). The reported estimates are the time-series averages of monthly cross-sectional regression coefficients. The time-series t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. In Columns (1) and (2), the sample period is 1976-2012. Due to data availability, the sample period for the regressions in Columns (4) and (5) (Panel B) . In the stock return regressions, the dependent variable is the annual stock return from July of year t to June of year t + 1. In the operating performance regressions, the dependent variables are operating performance measures Sales growth, Gross profit margin, and ROA for year t + 1, t + 2 and t + 3, respectively. The explanatory variables include Leader, Peer, and other control variables as in Table 4 or Table 5 . Leader is a dummy variable for R&D Leaders. Peer is a dummy variable for the Peers. In Panel A, STGrowth is the forecasted annualized percentage growth rate of consumption during years t to t + 5. LTGrowth is the forecasted annualized percentage growth rate of consumption during years t + 5 to t + 10. In Panel B, DISC growth is the change in other discretionary spending (which is the sum of SGA and capital expenditures), defined as the difference in discretionary spending in years t and t − 1 divided by discretionary spending in year t − 1. In the operating performance regressions, the t-statistics reported in parentheses are computed using the Newey-West procedure with a lag of three years. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Table 4 Yes Control variables as in Table 5 Yes Table 4 Yes Control variables as in Table 5 Yes This table reports stock returns to peer firms with low and high investor attention to cross-firm information. Panels A presents the Carhart four-factor alphas to equal-weighted portfolios of Peers with low (below-median) and high (above-median) investor attention measures. Investor attention to cross-firm information is measured by common analyst coverage, common mutual fund holdings, and common institutional holdings. Panel B reports the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions. The dependent variable is the annual stock returns from July of year t to June of year t + 1. Leader is a dummy variable for R&D Leaders. R&D growth is the difference in R&D expenditures in year t and t − 1 divided by R&D expenditures in year t − 1. RDE is R&D expenditures scaled by market value of equity. Ln(Size) is the log of market capitalization. B/M is the book-to-market ratio. Negative B/M dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the book-to-market ratio is negative. PrRET is the average monthly return during the past 11 months ending in May of year t. Industry PrRET is the average value-weighted industry returns in the past 11 months ending in May of year t. LowAttentionPeer is a dummy variable for Peers with low (below-median) investor attention. HighAttentionPeer is a dummy variable for Peers with high (above-median) investor attention. Own holdings/Analyst coverage are the number of analysts covering the firm as June of each year for column (1), 1,000 times the percentages of shares outstanding owned by active mutual funds for column (2), and 1,000 times the percentages of shares outstanding owned by institutional investors for column (3). t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The sample period is 1982-2012 for the analysis involving common analyst coverage and 1980-2012 for the analysis involving common mutual fund holdings and common institutional holdings. This table reports the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions that examine operating performance of peer firms with low and high investor attention to cross-firm information. The dependent variables are operating performance measures Sales growth, Gross profit margin, and ROA for year t + 1. The operating performance measures are expressed in percentage points. All variables except PrRET are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Leader is a dummy variable for R&D Leaders. R&D growth is the difference in R&D expenditures in year t and t − 1 divided by R&D expenditures in year t − 1. RDE is R&D expenditures scaled by market value of equity. Ln(Size) is the log of market capitalization. B/M is the book-to-market ratio when it is positive, and zero otherwise. Negative B/M dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the book-to-market ratio is negative. PrRET is the average monthly return during the past 11 months ending in May of year t. Industry PrRET is the average value-weighted industry returns in the past 11 months ending in May of year t. LowAttentionPeer is a dummy variable for Peers with low (below-median) investor attention. HighAttentionPeer is a dummy variable for Peers with high (above-median) investor attention. Investor attention to cross-firm information is measured by common analyst coverage, common mutual fund holdings, and common institutional holdings. Own holdings/Analyst coverage are the number of analysts covering the firm as June of each year, 1,000 times the percentages of shares outstanding owned by active mutual funds, and 1,000 times the percentages of shares outstanding owned by institutional investors, depending on the investor attention measure used. Lag OP is the lagged operating performance measures (Sales growth, Gross profit margin, and ROA) for year t. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are computed using the Newey-West procedure with a lag of three years. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The sample period is 1982-2012 for the analysis involving common analyst coverage and 1980-2012 for the analysis involving common mutual fund holdings and common institutional holdings. 
